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highly!developed!tradition!as!a! topic!of! research.!Compared! to!countries! like,!
for!instance,!the!United!States,!educational!institutions!that!foster!the!scientific!
examination!of! the!topic!are!also! fairly!rare! in!Austria.!Nonetheless,! there!are!
some!institutions,!which!established!the!scientific!discussion!about!tourism!as!






my!bachelor!studies,!which!I! finished!with!a! thesis! focusing!on!marketing!asL
pects! of! touristic! ventures.! Moreover,! whilst! my! subsequent! master! studies!
with!focus!on!corporate!finance!I!got!interested!in!the!financial!perspective!of!
those!ventures.!After! reading!several! studies!dealing!with!the!role!of!business!
plans! for! the!decisionLmaking!of!venture!capitalists,! the!research!question! for!
this!thesis!evolved.!
To!conclude,!I!want!to!say,!that! in!my!perception,!tourism!is!one!of!the!most!























































































































































































































































certain! amount! of! information! has! to! be! provided! to! potential! investors.!
Whereas! startLups! use! business! plans! for! this!matter,! touristic! ventures!make!
use!of!soLcalled!feasibility!studies,!which,!because!of!the!capital!intensity!of!such!







similar!manner,! the!hotel! investmentLmarket! as! the! sector! in!question!will!be!
portrayed,!yet!focusing!on!the!main!actors!in!the!market.!Since!those!actors!can!
be! seen! as! the! object! of! research,! the! second!part!will! above! all! address! their!
characteristics!and!their!respective!investment!approach.!To!get!a!closer!look!at!
the!hotel! as! the! investment! itself! too,! a! concise!outline!of! corporate! specifics,!
like!accounting!and!contract!design,!will!also!be!provided.!Understanding!those!
corporate!specifics! is! incremental! for! the!comprehension!of!a! feasibility!study,!
whose!basic!structure!is!then!depicted.!
! 2!












try.!Therefore,! the! focus!will!be!on! the! two!most! influential! touristic!markets,!
namely!the!USA!and!Europe.!After!a!discussion!of!the!initial!emergence!of!the!
industry,! its! chronological! examination! will! culminate! in! the! global! financial!
crisis!and!its!impacts!on!global!tourism.!





When! discussing! tourism! in! an! economic! or! scientific! way,! you! always! talk!
about!the!soLcalled!tourism!and!leisure!industry.!Besides,!the!term!tourism!coL
vers! everything! that! can! be! subsumed!under! hospitality! (lodging,! restaurants,!






















In! the!United! States,! the! first! big! hotel! companies! arose! in! the! course! of! the!
great!depression.!The!economic!chaos!of! this!era!created!opportunities! for! inL
dustry!consolidations!that!attracted!financiers,!such!as!Conrad!Hilton,!founder!














tration!of!ownership,!which!peaked! in!the!beginning!of! the! 1990s.! In! fact,! this!
amplified,!when!Real!Estate!Investment!Trusts!(REITs)2!for!the!first!time!offered!
a! particular! investment! vehicle! that! solely! offered! real! estate! investments!
(Hess/Liang/McAllister,!2001).!
Despite! all! this,! American! tourism! took! a! huge! hit! by! something! nobody! exL
pected.!Almost!100!year!after!the!birth!of!the!industry,!the!events!of!9/11!were!an!
external!factor!that!had!a!huge!effect!on!tourism.!Although!arrival!figures!in!the!
USA!did!not!shrink!by!more! than! 1%,! it!was! the! first! time! in!a!very! long!time!







private! equity! company! made! itself! the! biggest! hotel! company! in! the! world,!















iterranean.!After! that,!World!War!II! slowed!down!this!development!and! in! its!
aftermath,!most!of!the!touristic!matter!was!destroyed!(Dietsch,!2006).!The!postL




























































2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Private Equity Investors Other Investors TOTAL
1  Problemstellung und Zielsetzung 
Hotel Real Estate Private Equity Investitionen boomen. Mit einem Gesamtvolumen 
von 23,2 Mrd. Euro wurde in 2006 so stark auf den europäischen Hotelimmobilien-
märkten investiert wie nie zuvor. Auch im europäischen Kernmarkt Deutschland 
tätigen vornehmlich angloamerikanische Investoren großvolumige Transaktionen in 
einem bis dato nicht gekannten Ausmaß. Wie Abbildung 1 verdeutlicht,  
waren Private Equity Unternehmen im letzten Jahr in Europa bereits für 38,9 Pro-
zent des gesamten Hotelinvestmentvolumens verantwortlich. Ein Ende des Hotel 
Real Estate Private Equity Booms ist nicht in Sicht. Zum einem existieren nach wie 
vor hohe Kapitalbestände, zum anderen sind bereits weitere Hotelportfolios auf dem 















Abb. 1: Hotelinvestmentvolumen in Europa 2002–2006 (in Mio. Euro) (Quelle: Jones Lang LaSal-
le Hotels 2007)  
 
Zugleich herrscht in der deutschen Hotellerie als Hauptleistungsträger des Touris-
mus (Schräder 2000) ein Verdrängungswettbewerb und Konzentrationsprozess nie 
gekannten Ausmaßes (Frehse 2003, S. 324). Daneben mangelt es in der hiesigen 
Hotellandschaft fast schon historisch an Eigen- und Fremdkapital, so dass in letzter 
Zeit internationale Hotel Real Estate Private Equity Unternehmen auch in Deutsch-
land weitreichende Chancen gesehen haben, antizyklisch in eine Immobiliengattung 
zu investieren, mit der sie im Hinblick auf ihre Heimatmärkte schon längst vertraut 
sind (Jones Lang LaSalle Hotels 2004, S. 20). 
Ganz anders verhält sich hingegen der traditionelle Investorenkreis für Hotel-
immobilien in Deutschland. Offene und geschlossene Immobilienfonds zeigen sich 





































zunehmend zurückhaltend. Und auch internationale Hotelketten engagieren sich 
deutlich weniger. Während sie in Gesamteuropa im Jahr 2000 noch für 18,6 Prozent 
des gesamten Hotelinvestmentvolumens verantwortlich zeichneten, waren es 2005 
nur noch 7,1 Prozent (Jones Lang LaSalle Hotels 2006). Bemerkenswert ist dabei, 
dass es den Globalplayern auch in den Krisenjahren in Folge der Septemberan-
schläge 2001 und stark gedrosselten Investitionsaktivitäten anhaltend gelingt, über-
proportional zu wachsen. Während die weltweit zehn größten Hotelketten in 2001 
über 28.448 Hotels mit 3.365.798 Zimmern verfügten, waren es 2006 bereits 32.207 















Abb. 2: Wachstum der weltweit zehn größten Hotelketten 2001–2006 (Quelle: Hotels – verschie-
dene Jahrgänge)  
 
Und auch für Deutschland ließen internationale Hotelgesellschaften wie etwa Inter-
Continental Hotels Group, Hilton Hotels Cooperation oder NH Hoteles  
unlängst ihre ehrgeizigen Wachstumspläne verlauten. InterContinental kündigte an, 
ihr Label „Express by Holiday Inn“ solle in den nächsten zwei Jahren die am 
schnellsten wachsende Hotelmarke in Deutschland werden. Neun Häuser gibt es 
bislang, 50 sollen es werden (Bomke 2006, S. 5).  
Hilton plant die insgesamt größte Expansion in der Geschichte der Kette. Das 
Unternehmen will in den nächsten zehn Jahren weltweit 1.000 neue Hotels eröffnen. 
In Deutschland sollen bereits in den kommenden drei bis fünf Jahren etwa 15 bis 20 
Standorte für die Marke „Hilton Garden Inn“ sowie etwa gleich viele für die Eco-
nomy Marke „Hampton“ erschlossen werden (o.V. 2007a, S. 1). Deutschland als 











investment!market.! This! specific! ramification! will! be! thoroughly! discussed! in!
Chapter!2.1.2,!Impacts,of,the,GFC.!Despite!all!that,!there!are!voices!that!see!those!
impacts!of!the!GFC!in!a!totally!different!way.!Ritchie/Molinar/Frechtling!(2010),!
Papatheodorou et al.  41
Building on expert opinions and econometric models, the 
Academy economists address the impacts and implications 
of the global financial crisis for tourism from the perspec-
tives of Europe, Asia, and North America. It is acknowledged 
that the effect of the crisis on domestic tourism is ignored 
despite the possible substitution that may exist between 
domestic and international destinations. This is because appro-
priate data on domestic tourism are often not available or of 
poor quality.
Implications and Prospects 
for Tourism
According to the June 2009 UNWTO World Tourism Barom-
eter, international tourist arrivals rose by 1.9% in 2008 
despite the apparent deterioration of the trend during the year 
(Figure 2). As expected, international tourist arrivals declined 
in the first quarter of 2009 by 8% compared to the same 
period in the previous year (UNWTO 2009).
In the beginning of 2009, the UNWTO forecasts of inter-
national tourist arrivals worldwide showed a negative growth 
between 2% and 3% in the same year. However, given the 
changes in the economic outlook, the predictions have been 
revised downwards, and international tourist arrivals are now 
forecasted to decrease between 4% and 6% for the full year. 
According to the World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC), 
the growth rate of the travel and tourism industries slowed 
by 1.0% in 2008 in terms of GDP, its weakest performance 
since the 2001-2003 recession. Moreover, two difficult years 
are in prospect, with travel and tourism economy GDP likely 
to contract by 3.5% in 2009 and to expand by 0.25% in 2010 
(WTTC 2009). It should be noted that forecasts by WTTC 
and UNWTO tend to be optimistic. Thus, using data on real 
tourism imports from Australia, Canada, the United States, 
Japan, and 15 countries in the European Union,1 Smeral 
(2010) forecasts a fall in aggregate import demand by 10% 
in 2009. For 2010, two economic scenarios are depicted: 
one, an optimistic prospect of stagnation in tourism imports, 
and two, a pessimistic picture of persistent decline by 2%.
From a regional perspective, with the exception of Africa, 
all other world regions have experienced a decrease in arriv-
als in the first quarter of 2009. The highest impact was felt in 
Europe (–10%, for the first four months). The Americas have 
suffered mainly due to the slowdown of the United States 
and the Caribbean states (–5%), while the decline in demand 
for tourism in Asia and the Pacific has been faster than 
expected (–6%). Notably, the prospects for tourism in the 
major world regions are analyzed extensively in this (and 
previous) issue(s) of the Journal of Travel Research (Smeral 
2009, 2010). In these extrapolations, the author reports on tour-
ism imports at constant prices and exchange rates of the EU15 
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Figure 2. World international tourist arrivals
Source:   World Tourism Barometer (United Nations World Tourism Organization 2009).
Note: Percentage change over the same period of the previous year.
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reasonable travel distance from populous source markets) 
were suffering considerably less than long-distance destina-
tions since, in economically difficult times, tourists prefer 
holiday places that are ea y to reach by car. Staying closer to 
their homes reduces the surprise factor because tourists can 
minimize the risk in terms of pr duct prices and quality. Fur-
thermore, tourists apparently economize on the duration of 
their stay, scale back their expenditure per night, and tend to 
sacrifice secondary holidays (mini-breaks, city trips) rather 
than their main holidays (ETC 2009). Tourists also tend to 
book at the last moment, partly because they are not confi-
dent of their future job situation and partly because they 
hope to profit from last-minute bargains and cheaper deals 
(ETC 2009).
In general, there is also evidence that the crisis hit business 
travel harder than leisure travel. Moreover, overnight stays in 
both luxury and budget accommodations showed lower rates 
of decline than the average of all accommodations.
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) con-
firmed the slump in international tourism demand by finding 
an 8% decline in worldwide passenger traffic from January 
to May 2009. Hotel performance data from January to April 
2009 show a similar drop in tourism demand (UNWTO 
2009a): overall occupancy was down in all world regions. 
Revenue per available room (RevPAR) fell by double-digit 
rates, especially in Asia and the Pacific (–30.3%) and in 
Europe (–32.7%).
To stop the tailspin and boost private consumption, almost 
all advanced economies took massive fiscal and monetary 
action: in the United States, the negative general government 
balance as a percentage of the GDP rose from –6% (2008) to 
–10% (2009), and in the euro zone the increase was from 
–2% (2008) to –5.5% (2009).
Ma y coun ries hav  actually realized that tourism is of 
great importance for employment and value-added generation 
and have therefore taken measures to stimulate tourism demand 
and support tourism enterprises. In general, national stimulus 
packages concentrate on tourism promotion and marketing, 
but several countries also focus on fiscal and monetary mea-
sures (UNWTO 2009b). Their introduct on of such fiscal and 
monetary schemes highlig ts th  need for tourism enterprises 
to access credit and increase their liquidity in order to stay in 
business and employ people. Other measures applied are aimed 
at public–private partnership and travel facilitation (e.g., visa 
application process, cutting the costs of visas or abolishing 
visa requireme ts for certain source a kets).
In 2009, most of the advanced economies have been 
experiencing a sharp decline in their GDP. It could have been 
worse, but a major across-the-board economic policy effort 
appears to have prevented an even worse collapse. We do not 
kn w yet whether the signs of a slowdown in the contraction 
of output and trade are indicators of a sustainable recovery or 
only a temporary flash in the pan. In spite of such uncertain-
ties, projections by international organizations raise hopes 
for a recovery in the OECD area in 2010, but this recovery 
will be weak and fragile for some time yet (OECD 2009). 
Moreover, we ought to expect the negative economic and 
social consequences of the crisis to be long-lasting, and it 
will be especially difficult to reduce the high unemployment 
rates to a socially more acceptable figure. The recovery will 
be slow, and only moderate growth rates are expected in the 
medium term, also in tourism. This will affect the behavior 
of investors and consumers alike. It is more than doubtful 
whether tourism behavior will be the same after this crisis 
than it was before.
A previous study (Smeral 2009) analyzed the impact of 
the financial and economic crisis on European tourism as of 
the end of March 2009. Since then, an updated and more 
recent data set up to 2008 has become available, and also cer-
tain macroeconomic trends (especially the magnitudes of 
GDP declines) have become more tangible and more open to 
revision. The focus of the current study (completed by the 
end of August 2009) is on delivering an update for the Euro-
pean case (tourism imports of the EU-15)2 as well as on 
analyzing and forecasting the demand for international travel 
in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Japan in terms of 
tourism imports. The article first develops a range of fore-
casting models to project demand for foreign travel, and 
follows up with forecasts for 2009 and 2010, before discuss-
ing and comparing results. The conclusions will provide a 
critical discussion of the macroeconomic framework condi-
tions and their impact on future tourism.
Modeling Tourism Demand 
for Outbound Travel
Starting with the standard tourism demand model that results 
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Figure 1. Turnover in the hotel and restaurant sector in the EU-
27 over the past 3 months
Source: Business survey of the European Commission. Time period  
covered: January 2005 to July 2009.
Note: Balance of optimistic and pessimistic responses in percentage of 
businesses polled, seasonally adjusted. 






as! in! the! international! one.! Smeral! (2010)! explains! this! phenomenon!with! the!





tourism! in! comparison! to! leisure! tourism.!When! a! company! is! condemned! to!
cut!costs,!one!of!the!first!things!to!bite!the!dust!are!business!trips.4!
However,!there!are!many,!who!object,!that!there!also!may!be!some!opportuniL
ties! presented! by! the!GFC.! Sheldon! (2010)! perceives! a! big! chance! for! tourism!
operators! and!destination!managers! to! revalue! their! competitive! advantage! in!
the!long!run!and!make!internal!structural!realignment!to!enable!renewal.!














inflation! (Gyourko/Linneman,! 1988).! Barrows! and! Powers! (2008)! describe! a!
standard!cycle!within!a!regional!market!in!the!following!way:!










the! big! players! want! to! be! represented! and! not! quit! the! field.! So!
they!try!to!create!a!demand!not!through!new!quantity!but!through!
new! categories.! Nonetheless,! the! number! of! potential! customers!
hasn’t! changed.! Subsequently,!many! regions! are!now! faced!with! a!
massive!overbuilding.!
!






operating!business! did!no! longer! create! any! revenues,! the! appreciation!of! the!
underlying!realty!will!secure!their!investment.!What’s!more,!concerning!the!cirL
cumstances!obtaining!at!this!time,!this!conclusion!maybe!was!not!even!that!off.!
However,!over!the!course!of! time,!(and!as!we!will!see! in! further!consequence)!
this!paradigm!changed!completely.!
Bearing!the!internal!dynamics!in!mind,!the!tourism!industry!is!not!to!blame!for!







In!addition! to! that,! long! time!developments!also! shifted! the!global!demand! for!
touristic!products.!Demographic!change,!a!mounting!demand!for!products!espeL
cially! designed! for! certain! groups! (homosexuals,! pensioners,! teens! etc.)! and!





As! already! mentioned,! a! neat! expression! for! the! tourism! industry! is, cross%
sectional, subject,matter:!A!matter! that!affects!all! realms!of!society!and! is! likeL
wise!affected!by!them.!So!the!scientific!approach!for!discussing!the!matter!thus!
is!a!multidisciplinary!as!well!as!an! interdisciplinary!one.! Issues!range! from!orL
ganizational! management,! human! resource! management,! financial! manageL



































operator!and!owner,! for!example,!has!attracted!a! lot!of! researches,!engaged! in!
corporate!governance!studies.!










Similar! to! most! other! industries,! the! hotel! sector! offers! a! source! of! revenue!
apart!from!the!operating!business.!Since!touristic!ventures,!above!all!hotels!are!
very!capitalLintensive,!only!few!entrepreneurs!are!able!to!finance!a!new!project!









As! mentioned! previously,! the! Hotel! Investment! Market! in! the! years! prior! to!
2000!depicted! itself! as! almost! inexistent.! SmallL! to!medium! sized!hotels!were!
managed!by!their!respective!owners!and!also!the!big!hotel!chains!covered!both!
parts!within!their!portfolios.!
However,! since! the! year! 2000,! the! situation! changed.! Due! to! several! circumL
stances,!hotels!were!discovered!as!a!viable!investment!by!most!different!types!of!






































But! going! back! to! the! beginning! of! the! new! century,!what! prompted! the! unL
precedented!blast!of!the!investment!activity!in!this!very!industry?!




of! a!downswing,!which!promptly!happened! in!2000.! Stock!prices! in! all! indusL
tries!dropped!and!so!they!did! in!the!hotel! industry.!This! led!to!a!disparity!beL
tween!the!stock!price!and!the!actual!value!of!all!the!properties!of!the!respective!
company.! Consequently,! that! triggered! two! phenomena! in! the! financial!marL
















that! they!now!delivered!most! of! their! revenues! to! the! owner! of! the! property,!
they! were! back! in! business.! Of! course! they! lacked! the! return! created! by! the!
property!in!this!new!order,!but!they!also!got!rid!of!the!corresponding!risk.!These!
circumstances! led! to! a! reLevaluation!of! the!operating! companies! at! the! global!
financial!markets.!
To!utilize!this!effect,!management!companies!had!to!make!sure!that!they!would!



























investments! kept! growing! (see! fig.4).! As! far! as! what! we! know! from! research,!
commercial!real!estate! is!always!a! little!behind!residential.!Therefore,! it!would!
have!been!safe!to!assume,!that!the!rampant!growth!of!the!sector!will!come!to!an!





























































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   

















           







     


        









parently!bearing! in!mind! that!his! prediction! three! years! ago!was!not! that! off.!
The!cycle!headed!downwards.!The!only!thing!he!did!not!get!right!was!the!cause!
for!this!development.!
“Today!we’re! facing! a! unique! down! cycle.!While! new! hotel! development! had!
been!heating!up!between!2005!and!2007,!it!didn’t!reach!the!point!of!overbuildL
ing.! As! a! result,! this! downturn! was! not! induced! by! an! oversupply! problem.8!
While!there!was!abundant!and!inexpensive!financing!available!until!mid!2007,!it!
was!the!collapse!of!the!credit!markets!caused!by!the!defaults! in!the!subLprime!
residential! sector! that! led! to! a! drying! up! of! commercial! financing! starting! in!
2007”!(Rushmore,!2009,!p.18).!
So!what!had!happened!in!the!meantime?!
As! in!many! other! industries,! the! investment! volume! in! the! hotel! sector!went!
down!dramatically.!Jones!Lang!LaSalle!reported!that!the!global!transaction!volL
ume!shrank!by!76%!in!the!first!half!of!2008.!To!get!a!good!feeling!of!how!invesL
tors!appraise! the!current!situation,!big!players! in! the! industry!went! into!overL
drive,! regarding! research.! In! April! 2008,! the! Hospitality! Department! of! PWC!
conducted!a!survey!amongst!480!individuals,!if!they!think!that!Hotels!are!still!a!
good! buy! (PWC,! 2008).! Surprisingly,! a! lot! of! the! interviewees! answered! this!
question!with!yes.!They!admittedly!had!some!limitations.!Furthermore,!they,!for!
instance,! predicted! a! slowdown! of! the! highly! leveraged! buyers! and,! based! on!














three! quarters! of! the! total! transaction! value,! fell! dramatically.! However,! this!
phenomenon!can!easily!be!explained!with!the!already!mentioned!disappearance!









them green because they felt that 
in five or ten years time a green 
building will simply have more value 
than others.  
In addition a major international 
property group also notes, “We’re 
getting quite a lot of graduates 
very keen on asking what we’re 
doing on the CRI front and I don’t 




Hotels: still considered a  
good buy?
Hotels continue to be considered 
a good buy. “[We] love them if we 
can find the right partner, as they 
are so management intensive.” This 
sentiment is reiterated by another 
respondent: “Hotels have been very 
profitable for those who understand 
this market and there will be more 
opportunities.” Demand for this 
property type is underpinned by 
good trading conditions. Observers 
Hotel real estate investment: still considered a good buy? 
In the league table, the sector takes 
up the third position with a rating 
of 5.9; thus, investment prospects 
are considered modestly good 
and development prospects (6.0) 
are considered to be even slightly 
better. See Chart 2. According to 
survey participants, cap rates are 
expected to edge up by 23 basis 
points to reach 6.9 percent towards 
4
think that operating fundamentals 
remain good, although “probably 
not as strong as at the beginning of 
the year, because economic growth 
forecasts [were] scaled down a 
bit.” According to one respondent, 
the industry has seen exceptional 
conditions for the last 18 months, 
but “we’re going to revert to 
something we can call normality.”
2008 Prospects Rating Ranking*
Investment Prospects Modestly Good 5.9 5th
Development Prospects Modestly Good 6.0 6th




*in a list of all property sectors.
Emerging Trends in Real Estate Europe 2008 survey.
Chart 2: Hotels – Prospects and recommendations
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In this report...
• What happened to the 
investment market in 2008?
• Who was still buying or 
selling?
• How did Europe’s major 
transaction markets fare?
• When could things start to 
improve?
Introduction
We saw some warning signs in 2006 and the beginning of the 
end in 2007, but we had to wait until 
2008 before the party was o!  cially 
declared over. A" er a record year 
in 2006, in terms of the volume of 
hotel investment, activity in the 
European hotel market declined by 
approximately 7% in 2007. In 2008, it 
fell back enormously to just over €6 
billion, a drop of two-thirds.
We have seen declining hotel investment 
activity before, the last time in 2002, 
when the European hotel market 
dropped as a consequence of the 9/11 
a# acks in 2001. In the European Hotel 
Transactions report published in 2002, 
HVS noted a drop of more than 50% 
in hotel transactions from 2001 levels. 
However, this was primarily driven 
by plunging values as a direct result 
of inferior hotel trading performance 
leading to a gap in the asking and 
bidding prices. The decline was 
relatively short lived and thus transaction 
volumes started to increase again in 2003. 
At the time this report went to print, 
the situation was severe and deep. 
Banks had almost turned o$  the 
lending tap allowing only a few dribbles 
here and there. For those lucky enough 
to secure funding, the borrowing 
was a lot more expensive, which in 
turn a$ ected their  nancial leverage. 
This, combined with poor economic 
growth and a bleak outlook for many 
EU countries, also led to inferior hotel 
trading performance, further impeding 
transactions from all angles.
as stock exchanges across Europe 
began to plummet during the autumn, 
resulting in decreasing occupancy rates 
and a near halt in average rate growth. 
Hotels are somewhat dependent on 
the corporate and meeting, incentive, 
conference and exhibition (MICE) 
markets. Businesses have had to amend 
budgets and cut costs, reducing the 
amount of travel from these segments 
and negatively impacting overall 
hotel performance. Some markets, 
however, proved to be more resilient 
to the current economic situation and 
recorded positive RevPAR growth 
levels by the end of the year (for 
example, in Germany, with Berlin 
achieving close to 4% growth on the 
previous year, and in Switzerland, with 
Geneva and Zürich demonstrating 
RevPAR increases of 14% and 10%, 
respectively).
The Eurozone is estimated to have 
achieved GDP growth of 0.8% in 2008, 
compared to 2.7% in 2007. As a result 
of the plunging  nancial markets and 
the general global economic slowdown, 
the European economy as a whole 
entered into an economic crisis the likes 
of which had not been seen for over 
a decade. In the  rst half of the year, 
a reasonable economic environment 
allowed levels of hotel investment to be 
maintained, while hotel performance 
also managed to sustain itself. The 
second half of the year, on the other 
hand, saw an aggresive slowdown 
in hotel investment and a signi cant 
Thus 2008 saw a transformation. 
Interestingly, small and budget hotel 
companies were spo# ed buying assets 
in 2008 and private equity  rms with 
their highly leveraged business model 
joined other investors in playing the 
waiting game. Business models like 
the one used by GuestInvest found it 
challenging to survive the storms and 
major hotel operators were seen closing 
their shared ownership divisions. 
Few trophy assets managed to change 
hands during 2008, and there was only 
one asset that transacted at a value 
above €900,000 per room (compared to 
three in both 2006 and 2007). The JW 
Marrio#  Capri Tiberio Palace Resort 
& Spa on the Mediterranean island 
of Capri, Italy, was acquired for €61 
million or approximately €990,000 
per room under a sale-and-leaseback 
agreement.
Overall, we are now back to transaction 
volumes similar to those seen in 2002-
03 as shown in Figure 1, with many still 
wondering if we have hit the bo# om 
yet.
Hotels in Europe received a bit of a 
cold shower in 2008 when RevPAR 
started to fall as a result of the global 
economic downturn. Although the 
hotel industry managed to maintain its 
performance levels for the  rst half of 
the year, the beginning of the summer 
months saw RevPAR declines across 
European hotels. A" er the summer, the 





The!USA! suffered!most,!with!a!decline!of!81%! (DEKA,! 2009).! Similar! to!other!




were!amongst! the!most!active!sellers! in!this!period! in!the!USA.!Buyers!mostly!
were!REITS!and!institutional!investors!that!did!not!rely!on!a!high!leverage!ratio.!
In!the!EMEA!(Europe,!MiddleLEast,!Africa),!the!volume!of!transactions!dropped!
by!61%.!Like! in! the!USA,!portfolio! transactions! fell! to!only!45%!of! the!overall!


















account! for! just! a! small! fraction!of! the! activity.! In! 2010,!HNWI!and!Hotel! InL
vestment!companies!were!responsible!for!72%!of!the!global!transactions!(HVS,!
2010).!






tions! for! thirdLparty! utilisation.!Within! the! hotel! real! estate!market,! you! got!
what!you!bought!and!subsequent!adaptations!due!to!altered!market!conditions!
or! shifted! investment! focuses! in! your! portfolio! are! highly! capitalLintensive.!
What’s!more,!you!are!also! faced!with!much!higher!development!costs! than! in!
residential!real!estate!and,!furthermore,!your!leases!will!not!be!as!high!as!they!




















The!owner!buys!or!develops! the!hotel! and! then! “rents”! it! out! to! an!operating!
company!that!will!pay!him!a!certain!management! fee,!which!does!not!depend!






















Alongside! the! global! change! of! this! paradigm,! new! players! entered! the! stage.!
Jones!Lang!La!Salle!Hotels!lists!the!following!leading!actors!in!the!hotel!investL















come! from.!The!perpetual! change! in! the! industry! as!well! as! the! effects!of! the!




As!we! can! see,!North!America!Asia! and! the!Middle!East! suffered!most! in! the!
peak!year!of!the!crisis!(regarding!their!activity!in!Europe),while!Europe,!with!its!
low!share!of!private!equity!companies!and!portfolio!transactions,!regained!some!
strength! through! its!more! conservative! financing! behaviour.! In! the! year! 2010,!
things! somehow!got!back! to!normal.! Private! equity! companies! are! still! out! of!

















































































but! also! its! negative! correlation! with! the! general! stock! market! has! attracted!
many! investors.! Furthermore,! the! stagnating! returns! of! lodgingLstocks! have!
drawn!many!funds!to!the!property!section!(Quan/Li/!Sehgal,!2002).!




tions! and! five!portfolio! transactions.!Their! riskLaverse! strategy!was! a! good! arL
gument!whilst!the!credit!crunch,!when!it!came!to!talking!banks!into!giving!out!
loans!(HVS,!2011).!
Regarding! their! preferred!hotel! type,! they,! of! course,! are! looking! for! constant!
yields,!which!they!mostly!find!in!upscaleLluxury,!prime!urban!locations.!But!also!
large! portfolios! of!midscale! hotels! can! offer! good! yield! prospects! (Jones! Lang!








By! definition,! REITs! (Real! Estate! Investment! Trusts)! are! corporations,! which!
own!and!manage,!but!also!finance!real!estate.!To!be!classified!as!a!REIT,!those!
corporations! have! to! fulfil! certain! requirements.!Moreover,! to! give! the! prevaL
lence! of! this! business!model! a! push,! governments! all! over! the!world! offer! faL






































this! limited! discretion!minimizes! the! amount! of! free! cash! flow! that! could! be!
spent! on! negative!NPVLprojects.! This!mechanism! failed! in! the!mid! 1990s! and!
promptly!caused!a!sever!depreciation!of!REITs.!After!regulations!were!tightened!
again,! things! got! back! to! normal.! This! effect! is! perfectly! in! line!with! Jensen’s!







seen! that! in! contrast! to! other! real! estate! investment! vehicles,! the! downward!










Over! the! time,!REITS!more! and!more! specialised! on! certain! real! estate! types.!
Today,!93%!of!all!REITs!are!specialized.!A!possible!reason!for!that!could!be!the!




Hotel!REITs! fall! in! to! the!category!of!equity!REITs.!Within!this!class,! they!are!
known! as! the! “diva”! of! property! types! because! of! their! unpredictability! and!
enormous! running! expenses.!15!However,! they! only! play! a! small! role! in! the!




















When! it! comes! to! high! netLworth! individuals! (HNWI)! investing! in! hotel! real!













tal! net! worth).! But! most! of! the! deals! undergone! by! those! investors! exceed!
$!25,000,000.!
Only!7%!of!the!sample!indicated!themselves!as!riskLaverse.!The!portion!of!their!




























unique! characteristic! amongst! investors,! though! the! ruthlessness,!which! is! inL
herent!to!their!style!of!pursuing!this!paradigm,!is!sublime.!Private!equity!comL
panies!start! to!think!about!a!possible!date! for!an!exit!before!they!undergo!the!









equity! fund.!Those! funds!are!closed! funds,! so! the! investors!are!not!allowed!to!
redeem!their!investment!until!the!fund!is!dissolved.!The!investors!(limited!partL
ners)!in!this!fund!provide!the!capital.!This!group!is!usually!made!up!of!wealthy!
individuals,! foundations,! institutional! investors! etc.,! which! almost! never! have!
rights!of!coLdetermination!regarding!the!usage!of!their!money.!Before!potential!
profits! are!passed!on! to! the! shareholders! after! termination,! the!private! equity!
company!deducts!a!management!fee!as!well!as!a!share!of!the!profit.18!
However,! the!money! raised! from! investors!as!equity! is! just!a! small! fraction!of!
the!money!the!private!equity!company!uses!to!buy!potential!targets.!In!fact,!onL
ly!10%!to!30%!of!the!transaction!is!financed!with!equity.!The!major!part!consists!
of!partly! senior!and!partly! junior!debt!and! loans.!These! loans!are!provided!by!
banks,! but! also! by! other! financial! institutions,! which,! of! course,! are! distinct!
from! the! ones! providing! the! equity.! The! new! executive! board! also! provides! a!
small!fraction.!In!this!new!board,!proxies!of!the!private!equity!company!are!preL
sent!in!most!of!the!cases!(Kaplan/Strömberg,!2008).!
Private! equity! companies! look! for! targets! that! are! currently! undervalued,! yet!
promise!a!high!cash!flow!after!restructuring19.!Within!their!approach,!they!parL



















































similar to earnings) and its stock is trading at $20 per share. The REIT has 
the following cost of capital components:
Re (equity cost of capital)       = .12  













  = $833,333,333
The REIT has 17,500,000 shares outstanding. Thus the equity value (Ve) 
is 
Ve = $20 x 17,500,000
  = $350,000,000
Coincidently, $350,000,000 is the NAV – total equity value of all the 
hotels owned by the REIT. Thus, the hotel REIT currently trades at a 
discount to NAV.
The value of the outstanding debt also equals $350,000,000 making the 
market value $700,000,000.
"O?PQQPSUVOJTUJD?1&??SN?SFDPHOJ[FT?UIBU?UIFZ?DBO?CVZ?UIF?IPUFM?3&*5?
worth an estimated $833,333,333 as a private company for a total cost 
including debt assumption and a 28 percent price premium for the stock 
($25.60 per share) of approximately $800,000,000 (value as a public 
company). The firm completes the transaction. Immediately thereafter, 
the PE firm introduces additional borrowing that brings the debt-to-total 
value ratio up to 80 percent. The PE firm has the same Re and Rd as the 








  = $1,041,666,667
Given the PE firm’s ability to quickly act on the market undervaluation of 
the hotel REIT, the PE firm added $33,333,333 ($833,333,333 - 
$800,000,000) in value for their investors. Given that the PE firm can 
add leverage to the investment, they added another $208,333,334 
($1,041,666,667 - $833,333,333) in value. These value enhancements 
elevate investor IRRs by several percentage points as long as the hotel 
QSPQFSUJFT?DPOUJOVF?UP?QSPEVDF?DBTI??PX?PG??NJMMJPO?PS?NPSF? J.B.C.
An Example of How Private Equity Firms Add Value through Acquisitions and Leverage
! 34!
the!new! total!value! (Vt)! is! also!correct.! In! this! calculation,!Corgel! insinuates!a!
constant!WACC!over!time.!Especially!within!LBOs!however,!WACC!is!most!likeL
ly!to!change,!because!the!high!debt!service!will!ultimately!affect!the!debtLto!eqL




































Also! IPOs! are! a! popular!way! of! exiting! an! investment! amongst! private! equity!
companies.! By! transforming! their! hotel! portfolio! into! a! corporation! they! go!
public.23!In!many!cases,!hotel!portfolios!of!private!equity!companies!are!turned!
into! a! REIT! to! do! so.! The! most! prominent! example! is! the! Starwood! Capital!




the! number! of! potential! buyers! is! vanishingly! low.! Expect! the! private! equity!
company! and! the! former! hotel! owner! agreed! on! a! sellLandLbuyLback! deal! beL
forehand.!For!smaller!private!equity!companies!it!is!common!to!buy!distressed!





























historic! development! of! the! hotel! investment! market,! investors! underwent!


















always!had! the! reputations! to! serve!as!an! inflation!hedge.! In!a! seminal!paper,!
Gyourko!and!Linnemann!(1988)!stated!that!especially!REITS!show!a!strong!negL
ative! correlation! to! inflation.! Yet,! nowadays,! their! results! are! questioned!with!
increasing! frequency,! because!more! and!more! evidence! is! found! that! lodging!
assets!may!in!general!be!more!of!an!inflation!protection!than!a!hedge,!because!
they! apparently! react! positive! to! inflationary! environments! (Quan/Li/Sehgal,!
2011).!Beyond!answering!this!question,!this!chapter!should!provide!evidence!on!









































































































































































tels!mainly! are!HNWIs! and! private! equity! companies.!HNWIs,! as! a!matter! of!
fact,!never!publish!the!returns!of!their!investments.!It!though!can!be!assumed,!
that!within! their! investment!policy! of! choosing! target! objects! by! their! promiL
nence!and!prestige,!returns!may!be!not!that!pleasing!all!the!time.!On!top!of!that,!
margins!in!the!luxury!sector!are!not!that!high,!especially!when!you!own!just!one!




If! things! are!going!well! and! it! is! altogether!part!of! their! strategy,!HNWIs!will!
rake!in!a!profit,!when!selling!the!premise.!The!same!is!true!for!the!private!equity!




















investment! in!the! luxury!sector,!one!has!to! invest! into!an!upscale!hotel!chain,!


















The! first! study!was! carried! out! by!Daniel!Quan,! Jie! Li! and!Ankur! Sehgal! and!
published!in!“Cornell!Hotel!and!Restaurant!Administration!Quarterly”!in!2002.!
The!authors!tried!to!examine!the!returns,!the!volatilities!and!the!diversification!
potential! of! lodging! assets! between! the! years! 1995! and! 2000.! For! this! they!
looked!at!the!Lodging!Property!Index!(LPI),!which!is!listed!by!the!“Cornell!UniL
versity! School!of!Hotel!Administration”! every!quarter!of! the! year.!To! see!how!
lodging! properties! performed! against! other! commercial! properties,! they! also!
looked!at!the!Index!of!the!“National!Council!of!Real!Estate!Investment!FiduciarL
! 40!














adjusted! returns!of! lodging! assets! are!more! appealing! than! those!of! the!other!
asset!classes.!In!addition!to!that,!we!see!that!lodging!properties!in!the!midLprice!
segment!yielded!the!highest!returns,!followed!by!those!in!the!upscale!segment.!
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to 1991.5  Using data from 17 countries, Quan
and Titman found positive long-term correlations
between stocks and commercial real-estate price
changes.6  Their reasoning was that both real es-
tate and stocks were driven up or down by chang-
ing ec nomic conditions that can only be ob-
served over long time horizons.
Similarly, numerous studies were conducted
such as those done by Gyourko and Linneman
to examine real estate’s viability as an inflation
hedge.7  While the outcome is still not completely
clear, it seems that real estate is not such a sig-
nificant inflation hedge as it was believed to be.
Little research has been done on portfolio al-
location for lodging properties. Firstenberg, Ross,
and Zisler showed that hotels have the highest
returns and risks compared to other property
types.8  Since that time the lodging industry has
seen a full c cle—experiencing a serious down-
turn, consolidation, and recovery. DeRoos and
Corgel showed that lodging assets have more vari-
ability than other real-estate classes.9  However,
the appropriate allocation of lodging could not
be evaluated before its correlations with other
classes were properly measured.
Following Firstenberg, Ross, and Zisler, our
initial assumption as that lodging properties
would have both a higher return and a higher
EXHIBIT 1
Cumulative wealth indices of capital-market securities (1995–2000)








1995 1996 1996 1997 1997 1998 1998 1999 1999 2000
4 2 4 2 4 2 4 2 4 2
" Lodging Property Index
• S&P 500 stocks
# Small-company stocks
+    Inflation
– Long-term government bonds
* Long-term corporate bonds• U.S. Treasury bills
5 E. Worzala and K. Vandell, “International Direct Real
Estate Investments as Alternative Portfolio Assets for Insti-
tutional Investors: An Evaluation,” Paper presented at the
1993 AREUEA meetings, Anaheim, CA.
6 Daniel C. Quan and Sheridan Titman, “Do Real Estate
Prices and Stock Prices Move Together? An International
Analysis,” Real Estate Economics, Vol. 27 (1999), pp. 183–
207.
7 J. Gyourko and P. Linneman, “Owner-occupied Homes,
Income-producing Properties, and REIT’s as Inflation
Hedges: Empirical Findings,” Journal of Real Estate Finance
and Economics, Vol. 1 (1988), pp. 347–372.
8 Paul M. Firstenberg, Steven A. Ross, and Russell C. Zisler,
“Real Estate: The Whole Story,” Journal of Portfolio Man-
agement, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Spring 1988).
9 See: Jan A. deRoos and Jack B. Corgel, “Hotel Invest-
ments in the Portfolio: Are They Part of the Core?,” Real
Estate Finance, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer 1997), pp. 29–37;
and Jan A. deRoos and Jack B. Corgel, “The Lodging Prop-
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volatility than does commercial real estate, and
would have low correlation with real-estate re-
turns. This assumption is attributable to the lodg-
ing sector’s ability to lead the real-estate cycle
because it does not have the same “inertia” as
long-term real-estate leases. While hotel rates and
occupancies drop quickly in periods of economic
recession, they also react quickly to periods of
boom—something not witnessed in commercial
real estate.
Comparing Lodging-property Returns
with Other Capital-market Assets
Although we would have preferred a longer time
horizon for our analysis, the period of 1995 to
2000 constitutes an intriguing time to analyze
lodging returns against those of other asset classes.
First, this period represents an upswing in the
lodging cycle. Second, this period can be broken
down into two macroeconomic cycles due to the
Asian currency crisis and later the technology
boom—thereby representing a suitable period to
show lodging’s ability to be a common-stock-
diversification vehicle. Finally, the lodging indus-
try has undergone fundamental changes during
this period in terms of mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) and REIT activities, all of which have
major effects on returns.
Returns and aggregate values. We compare
returns of the Lodging Property Index with those
of six other asset classes in the capital markets.
Our intention is to capture as broad a picture as
possible of the contemporary financial markets.
We use the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 Com-
posite Index (with realized dividends added) as a
surrogate for the large-company-stock series. The
small-company-stock series is represented by the
bottom one-fifth of the stocks by market capi-
talization on three major exchanges: New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Ex-
change (AMEX), and National Association of
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
(NASDAQ). Likewise, the long-term govern-
ment bonds, T-bills, and long-term corporate
bonds (rated AAA) constitute a diversified fixed-
income pool across a variety of maturities and
risks. Finally, we use the NCREIF index from a
database of property operating information from
NCREIF to measure commercial real-estate
returns.
Cumulative Performance
Exhibit 1 shows the cumulative wealth growth
(including reinvestment) of a dollar invested in
six asset classes on October 1, 1995, through the
second quarter of 2000. As one can see, all asset
classes have a return above the inflation rate over
the period studied. Common stocks had the high-
est total returns over this period, with a com-
pound quarterly return of 5.62 percent. The LPI
showed the second-largest return, with com-
pounded quarterly return of 4.79 percent. The
small-company index finished third with a 4.08-
percent return, compounded quarterly, but also
with much higher volatility. The fixed-income
categories displayed respectable compounded
quarterly returns ranging from 1.25 percent for
T-bills to 1.92 percent for government bonds.
Risk and Returns
Exhibit 2 reports the arithmetic and geometric
(compounded) returns of the various asset classes
along with sub-categories of the LPI. Our mea-
sure of risk, the standard deviation of returns, is
EXHIBIT 2
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also presented. The results show that large-
company stocks had the highest returns, followed
by lodging properties. However, when we disag-
gregate the lodging index by price segments, we
find that the upscale and midprice segments,
along with properties in the east region, have a
higher return than do common stocks over this
period. Lodging-property returns in the upscale
segment were 6.19 percent, while the midprice
segment’s return was 7.50 percent over this pe-
riod, as compared to 5.62 percent for common
stocks. Furthermore, both of these sectors have
lower standard deviations (4.62 percent for up-
scale and 6.67 percent for midprice) when com-
pared with the standard deviation of 7.63 per-
cent for S&P 500 stocks. The worst-performing
lodging properties were those in the economy
segment, which recorded the lowest return of all
asset classes at 0.71 percent, and properties lo-
cated in the south, which had an annual return
of 2.61 percent. Overall, with the exception of
these two categories, lodging properties outper-
formed many of the competing asset classes,
notably the S&P 500, the small-company stock,
and the real-estate indexes.
The exceptional returns from midprice, up-
scale, and east-region lodging properties during
this period can be attributed to a number of rea-
sons. First, the economic boom in the United
States particularly favored the midprice and up-
scale hotel segments, the values of which sub-
stantially appreciated. Second, both of these sec-
tors have undergone major restructuring, which
has improved operating margins and profitabil-
ity. Third, high barriers to entry helped boost
these sectors’ occupancies and average daily rates.
As a whole, the lodging sector commanded re-
spectable risk-adjusted returns over this period.
EXHIBIT 3
Correlation of lodging-property returns with those of












-0.06 0.06 -0.14 *
0.26 0.02 -0.13 0.19 *
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*An item’s correlation with itself is always 1.0.




The! purpose! of! the! second! study,! conducted! by! Gabriel! Petersen! and! Arjun!
Singh! in! the! “Journal! of! Retail! &! Leisure! Property”! also! in! 2003,! was! to! get! a!
closer!look!on!the!relationship!between!lodging!assets!and!other!real!estate!clasL









































apartment and hotel. The returns of each sector are compared to
semi-annual changes in the GDP and consumer price index (CPI).
Figures 2 and 3 track the trend in commercial property values
during the study period in comparison to CPI and GDP. Several
interesting features emerge from an analysis of these three figures.
Table 1 summarises average returns, risk and the risk-adjusted
return for the property sectors for the 20-year period studied.
First, as compared to the other property sectors it is clear that
hotel returns have been more volatile over the period (Figure 1).
The only other sector with similar volatility during the study period
is the office sector. This is c nfirmed in Table , which shows that
hotel and office sector returns had standard deviations of 4.98 and
4.20 per cent respectively.
As noted in Figure 1, sharp increases nd drops in hotel retur s
are particularly noticeable in 1982–1983, 1986–1987, 1990–1992,
1993–1998, 1998–1999 and most recently after September 11th. This
can be attributed to specific factors unique to hotel real estate,
which positively or negatively impacted on returns. The 1980s
started with a building boom because of four complementary
factors: tax ince tives for real est te investment, low interest rates,
availability of capital and product segmentation. As a result, supply
increased without a corresponding increase in demand, resulting in
a sharp drop in returns in 1983 that continued until 1986. During
the period from 1983 to 1987, the annual growth of room supply
was more than 4 per cent each year, and in 1987 it was over 7 per
cent. Demand could not keep up with the frenzied pace with which
new hotels were being added, and as a result hotel operators
competed by slashing room rates.25
As the lodging industry entered the 1990s, it was severely affected
by a national recession. The excess hotel building of the 1980s had
resulted in a dramatic increase in numbers of hotel rooms. An
overbuilt industry faced declining demand for rooms, due to a
reduction of overall travel because of the Gulf War (1990–1991)
and an economic recession. National occupancies bottomed out at
61.8 per cent in 1991. Due to the oversupply of rooms, hotels had
to reduce room rates, which further affected profitability. The hotel
industry suffered heavy losses during this period — net losses of
US$5.7bn in 1990 and US$2.8bn in 1991.26
The lodging returns started to show an upward trend in 1994 and
continued to improve until 1998, as a result of demand catching up
Specific factors
unique to hotel real
estate
Oversupply
Table 1: Summary of multi-property type risk and return (1982–2001)
Office Retail Industrial Apartment Hotel
Average semi-annual return (%) 3.24 4.18 4.33 4.95 4.02
Risk (standard deviation) (%) 4.20 2.79 3.09 2.50 4.98
Sharpe ratio –0.10 0.19 0.22 0.52 0.07
Annual return (geometric mean) (%) 6.09 8.04 8.33 9.59 7.57
Average return (annualised) (%) 6.58 8.53 8.86 10.15 8.20
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A-Petersen and Singh
analysis moves one step closer to devising an optimal diversification
mix.
An analysis of Table 2 indicates that hotel returns have a low
correlation with the apartment sector (0.34) and a negative
correlation with the retail sector (–0.06). Hotels show a relatively
stro ger correlation with the office (0.50) and industrial (0.43)
subsectors. T is suggests hotels can offer higher diversification
benefits in portfolios with a heavier concentration of apartments
and retail.
It is also important to note that the correlation between the
traditional real estate property sectors (office, retail, industrial and
apartment) is ry high. These correlations range from a high of
0.96 between office and industrial sectors to the lowest correlation
between retail and apartment sectors of 0.61. Thus, forming real
estate portfolios with only the traditional sectors has low potential
for portfolio risk reduction.
The ability for hotels to adjust room rates is reflected in the
inflation protection offered by lodging properties (0.04). The long-
term lease structure of other property sectors, such as office,
industrial and apartment, results in a negative correlation with CPI.
IDENTIFYING AN EFFICIENT FRONTIER OF INVESTMENT USING
MPT
Even though correlation analysis provides some information on an
asset’s potential for diversification, it does not consider the risk
associated with including the asset in a portfolio. The areas not
covered by the correlation analysis can be gained by applying MPT
as an analytical tool. Although much criticised due to practical and
theoretical difficulties, MPT remains the standard tool for
investigating the relevance, and impact, of an asset in a multi-asset
portfolio.28
MPT uses the concept of mean-variance efficiency as a way to
allocate capital among a portfolio of assets. Therefore, an ‘optimal
portfolio’ is defined as one that maximises return for a given level
of risk, or minimises risk for a given level of return. Inputs into the
calculation of the ‘optimal allocation’ of, or within, a portfolio
include estimates of expected return, standard deviation or variance
(risk), and correlation of return for a set of assets. For this
Optimal
diversification mix





Table 2: Cross-correlation matrix (Jan 1982 to Dec 2001)
CPI GDP Office Retail Indust ial Apartment Hotel
CPI 1.00
GDP 0.28 1.00
Office –0.15 0.25 1.00
Retail 0.14 0.45 0.63 1.00
Industrial –0.12 0.26 0.96 0.70 1.00
Apa tment –0.03 0.35 0.79 0.61 0.79 1.00
Hotel 0.04 0.07 0.50 –0.06 0.43 0.34 1.00








Therefore,! contract! designers! should! anticipate! possible! information! asymmeL
tries!and!try!to!prevent!situations!that!would!create!moral!hazards!for!the!manL
agers!or!lead!to!holdLup!risks.!But!as!we!know,!many!principal!agent!problems!
cannot! be! anticipated! and! have! to! be! solved! on! the! spot.! This,! however,! lies!
within!the!scope!of!the!hotel!assetLmanager,!who!has!a!whole!chapter!reserved!
for!him!(Chapter!3.3,Hotel,Asset,Management).,













• RiskLprofile! of! the!manager! (Risk! averse!managers!will! prefer! lease! conL
tracts)!
• Desired! fiscal! type! of! income! of! the! investor! (Income! from! commercial!





However,! it! can! be! assumed! that! the! owner! will! be! the! dominating! part! in!







Fixed. lease. contract:!The! lease! is!perpetually!a!certain!percentage!of! the! inL
vestment!(mostly!around!6%).!Very!riskLaverse!investors!prefer!this!form.!It!reL



































In!most! cases,! the! investing! company! as!well! as! the! operating! company!


















The!duration!of! the!contract! is!hinging!on! the! standing!of! the!operating!
company.!If!it!is!a!wellLknown!brand,!longer!terms!can!be!negotiated!as!if!
it!were!an!independent!company.!











cinity!of!each!other.!Owners! try! to!prevent! this!scenario!with!a!soLcalled!






















to!base! the! fee! on! a! certain!RevPar! (Revenue!per! available! room)!penetration!
that!depends!on!the!location!and!age!of!the!property!and!on!a!certain!GOP!penL
etration!that!orients!itself!on!the!market!average!and!by!this!offsets!possible!exL
ternal!downswings.!Table!7! lists!the!things!that! fall! into!managements!control!
and!those!who!do!not.!
After!all,!management!fees!should!incentivize!the!management!to!generate!high!





















deal! is! sealed.!Although!this! thesis!concentrates!on!how! investors!derive! their!















the  higher  RevPAR  stems  from  a  higher  ADR).  Therefore,  all  other  things  being  equal,  this  same  hotel 





Some  management  contracts  introduce  some  level  of  recognition  of  RevPAR  penetration  in  their 
performance  clauses.  Such  clauses  commonly  suggest  that  if  RevPAR  falls  below  90%  of  the  market’s 
RevPAR, there may be cause for termination. Unfortunately, these clauses have typically been used only to 
guard against poor management performance,  not  to  set  compensation.  Furthermore,  the 90%  level has 


















































ny.32!But! what! we! have! seen! in! the! previous! chapter! is! that! the!management!
company!does!not!have!the!sole!responsibility!for!accomplishing!a!certain!peneL
tration!of!key! figures.! (See! tab.! 7)!However,! the!owner!and! the!manager!have!
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value! of! work! their!manager! is! doing.! Using! those! figures,! one! always! has! to!
bear! in!mind! that! they! strongly!depend!on! the! location!and! the! reputation!of!
the!hotel.! For! example,! a!midscale! city!hotel! can! expect!occupancy!of! 70%!or!




RevPar.! It! depicts,! if! the!management! is! getting! the!most! out! of! every! single!
room!or!not.!Furthermore,!it!is!the!perfect!benchmark!to!compare!a!hotel!to!its!
closest!competitors.!
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Table 8-1 Historical Operating Performance – Wellington Hotel (£ 000s) 
2005 2004
Number of Rooms: 250 250
Occupied Rooms: 67,525 68,438
Days Open: 365 365
Occupancy: 74.0% 75.0%
Average Rate: 74.05 72.90 Percentage
RevPAR: 54.79 54.67 of Revenue
REVENUE
   Rooms 5,000 52.8 % 20,000 74.05 4,989 52.9 % 19,956 72.90
   Food & Beverage 3,900 41.2 15,600 57.76 3,880 41.1 15,520 56.69
   Telephone 175 1.8 700 2.59 172 1.8 688 2.51
   Other Income 400 4.2 1,600 5.92 390 4.1 1,560 5.70
      Total 9,475 100.0 37,900 140.32 9,431 100.0 37,724 137.80
 DEPARTMENTAL EXPENSES*
   Rooms 1,230 24.6 4,920 18.22 1,200 24.1 4,800 17.53
   Food & Beverage 2,714 69.6 10,856 40.19 2,648 68.2 10,592 38.69
   Telephone 112 64.0 448 1.66 109 63.4 436 1.59
   Other Expenses 200 50.0 800 2.96 190 48.7 760 2.78
      Total 4,256 44.9 17,024 63.03 4,147 44.0 16,588 60.59
DEPARTMENTAL INCOME 5,219 55.1 20,876 77.29 5,284 56.0 21,136 77.21
UNDISTRIBUTED OPERATING EXPENSES
   Administrative & General 777 8.2 3,108 11.51 758 8.0 3,032 11.08
   Marketing 265 2.8 1,060 3.92 259 2.7 1,036 3.78
   Prop. Operations & Maint. 360 3.8 1,440 5.33 351 3.7 1,404 5.13
   Utilities 237 2.5 948 3.51 231 2.4 924 3.38
      Total 1,639 17.3 6,556 24.27 1,599 17.0 6,396 23.36
GROSS OPERATING PROFIT (GOP) 3,580 37.8 14,320 53.02 3,685 39.0 14,740 53.85
Management Fee 284 3.0 1,136 4.21 290 3.1 1,160 4.24
GOP AFTER MANAGEMENT FEES 3,296 34.8 13,184 48.81 3,395 36.0 13,580 49.61
FIXED EXPENSES
   Property Taxes 199 2.1 796 2.95 194 2.1 776 2.83
   Insurance 28 0.3 112 0.41 28 0.3 112 0.41
   Incentive Management Fee 330 3.5 1,320 4.89 339 3.6 1,356 4.95
   Reserve for Replacement 284 3.0 1,136 4.21 283 3.0 1,132 4.14
     Total 841 8.9 3,364 12.45 844 9.0 3,376 12.33
Net Operating Income 2,455 25.9 % 9,820 36.36 2,551 27.0 % 10,204 37.28














Based on the market for hotel accommodation in the Newtown area, as 
well as the Hotel’s anticipated future market position, we have 
developed a forecast of income and expense. The forecast starts on 1 
January 2006 and represents our opinion of how a competent 
management company would operate the Hotel. 
Forecast of Income 
and Expense 
In forecasting revenues and expenses for a hotel, we use a fixed and 
variable component model. This model is based on the premise that 
hotel revenues and expenses have one component that is fixed and 
another that varies directly with occupancy or facility usage. A projection 
can be made by taking a known level of revenue or expense and 
















institutional! investors! very! much! rely! on! a! conservative! financing! strategy.!
However,!the!question!of!the!right!financingLmix!does!not!end!with!signing!the!
contract.!For!one!thing,!it!is!not!clear,!if!the!chosen!capital!structure!may!have!
an! outcome! on! the! subsequent! performance.! And! for! another! thing,! many!
scholars!argue!that!a!target!capital!structure!needs!adjustment!over!time.!
Since! this! thesis! concentrates! on!hotel! investors,! the! focus! should!be! on!how!
they! undertake! and!manage! their! investments! in! hotels.!How! they! undertake!
the!investment!has!already!been!discussed!in!chapter!2.2!Hotels,as, Investment.!
After!the!transaction,!their!aim!should!be!to!equip!the!respective!subsidiary!that!
owns! the! hotel! “for! them”!with! a! capital! structure! that! allows! onLgoing! reinL















for! small! companies! or! individuals! that! plan! to! build! a! hotel.! Regardless! of!
whether!they!manage!the!hotel!or!they!get!an!operating!company!to!do!it,!unL
less!they!have!less!than!ten!hotels,!none!of!our!investor!types!will!even!consider!
them! as! an! investment.! So! they! have! to! look! for! loans! and! interests! by! small!





















LongLterm! debt! is! the!most! prevalent! form! in! today’s! hotel! business.! This! is!
mainly!resulting!from!the!by!now!wellLestablished!equity!gap!that!is!inherent!to!
the! industry.!Halling,! Stomper,!Zechner! (2006)! list! the! following!possible! reaL
sons!for!this!phenomenon.!
• High!overheads!of!issuing!equity!





ratios!up! to! L20%!for!a! long! time.! It!was!not!until! the! introduction!of!Basel! II!
that!hotels! started!worrying!about!cleaning!up! their!balance! sheet.!After! that,!




borrowing! for! companies! (Schumacher/Wiesinger,! 2009).! Therefore,! it! is! no!
longer!advisable!for!hotel!companies!to!just!rely!on!the!debt!market.!
Whatever!the!circumstances!are,!debt!will!always!play!a!role!in!hotel!financing.!
Consequently,!we!should! look!at! the!most!common!forms!of!debt!used! in! the!
sector.!Most! often,! hotel! projects! are! financed!with! longLterm!debt.! Banks! alL
most!always!provide!these!loans,!but!also!insurances,!savings!and!loan!associaL
tions!and!HNWIs!are!a!possibility!as!creditors.!Due!to!the!highly!volatile!cash!







As!we!know!by!now,!equity! is!out!of! reach! for!many!hotel!companies.!Due! to!
Basel!II!though,!they!forced!to!increase!their!equity!ratio.!So,!what!are!the!most!





During! the! formation! or! in! form! of! a! capital! increase.! During! the! formation,!
most!of! the!equity!comes! from!silent!partnerships.!Besides,! those!partners!are!
also! the!ones!providing! the!capital! for! subsequent!capital! increases.!There!are!
essentially! two!ways,! how! they! can! take! a! share! of! the! company.! Either! they!
provide!the!classic!form!of!equity,!which!guarantees!them!no!voting!rights!and!
is!mostly!set!up!as!a! longLterm!investment!or!they!offer!a! form!of!mezzanineL
capital.37!This!became!very!popular! for!a! financing!in! later!development!stages!
because! it’s! often! combined!with! “equity! kickers“.! For! instance,! investors! can!
sell! their! shares! at! a! premium!or! they! are! granted! an! interest! rollLup.!But! for!






















Literature! provides! us!with! various!models! to! explain! the! capital! structure! of!
companies.!Based!on! the! irrelevance! theorem!of!Modigliani! and!Miller! (1958),!
two!somehow!opposing!schools!of!thought!have!developed!in!the!last!century.!
The!pecking!order! theory!by!Myers!and!Majluf! (1984),! claiming! that!decisions!
regarding!capital!structure!are!governed!by!the!availability!of!a!certain!kind!of!
capital!and!its!ranking!within!the!pecking!order!and!the!static!tradeLoff!theory,!
which! suggest! to! always! outweigh! the! benefits! and! costs! related! to! debt! and!










capital! structure! and! rather! use! the! industry! average! for! their! financing!mix.!




nancial! debt! in! correspondence! to! the! availability! of! internal! funds”! (SwinL
nen/Voordeckers/Vademale,!2005,!p.1).!
To!see,!if!the!findings!Swinnen,!Voordeckers!and!Vademale!are!also!applicable!




tal! structure! of!UK!quoted! organisations!which! possess! an! interest! in! owning!























Myer’s!and!Majluf’s! theory! (1984)! that! there! is!a!positive! relationship!between!
longLterm!debt!and!firm!performance.!
As! an! addendum! to! the! previous! studies,! a! paper! of!Giroud,!Müller,! Stomper!
and! Westerkamp! (2012)! should! be! mentioned.! They! looked! ad! Austrian! skiL
hotels!undergoing!a!debt!restructuring.39!One!of!their!findings!was!that!in!most!
of! the! cases,! reducing! the! debt! overhang! improved! performance.! This! is! also!
consistent!with!the!rejection!of!Myers!and!Majluf!theory!(1984)!by!Phillips!and!
Sipahiouglu! (2004)! that! there! is!a!positive! relationship!between!debt!and!perL
formance.!The!restructurings!did!though!not!only!affect!performance.!The!auL




debt! overhang! can! be! a! profitable! tool! for! companies,! but! as! far! as! SMEs! are!























and! from! the! outset! have! an! exit! strategy,! while! hotel! managers! strive! for! longL
lasting!contracts.!The!owner’s!focus!tends!to!be!more!on!the!revenue!side,!managers!
want!cost!control.!When!business! is!going!good,!on!the!other!hand,!hoteliers,! like!



















site! inspection! at! one! of! the! current! projects,! his! tasks! also! include! consultaL
tions!with! regard! to!possible! future! investments.!But! this!will! be!discussed! in!
the!next!chapter!3.3.2!Risk%Management.!
Denton!(2003)!divides!the!tasks!of!the!asset!manager!into!two!clearLcut!remits:!




















































As! one! can! see,! asset!managers! need! profound! industry! knowledge!within! fiL
nancial!aspects!as!well!as!in!operations.!He!should!keep!the!manager!at!a!short!





















































































tionnaires,! completed! by! nascent! entrepreneurs! in! the!USA! as! part! of! a! large!
survey.! His! aim!was! to! get! an! answer! to! these! very! questions.! Does! business!
planning!enhance!your!chances!as!an!entrepreneur?!What!purposes!does!it!exL
actly!serve?!What!are!the!most!crucial!parts!within!a!business!plan?!
Whilst!his!main! results!were! that!making! financial!projections!and!constantly!
adapting! the! business! plan! strongly! increases! your! chances! that! your! venture!
will!be!successful,!he!also!tracked!a!relationship!between!business!planning!and!
acquiring!outside!financing,!which!strongly!bears!upon!the!results!of!this!work.!
Since! business! planning! is! much! easier! and! much! more! common! nowadays,!




His! results! confirmed! this! hypothesis,! since! business! plans,!which! clearly! had!
just!a!ceremonial!purpose,!meaning!that!they!e.!g.!did!not!contain!financial!proL
jections,!were! less!successful! in!acquiring!outside!financing!than!the!ones!that!













Before! we! talk! about! the! relevance,! stakeholders! and! features! of! a! feasibility!














Especially! in! tourism,! feasibility! studies! are! very! common.! A! reason! for! this!
might!be!that!touristic!projects,!such!as!hotels!contain!large!investment!sums.!
So!developers!really!want!to!reach!clarification!before!they!put!up!a!building.!As!


















ing,!presented!a! revenue!of! $!bn.!2.9! in!2010.!Their!operations,!of! course,! also!
include!other! things! than!conducting! feasibility!studies.!HVS!has!a!much!narL
rower!focus!on!the!hospitality!industry.!Their!key!feature!is!their!dedication!to!
science.!Being! the!biggest!partner!of! the! “Cornell!School!of!Hotel!AdministraL
tion”,!they!are!omnipresent!within!the!scientific!community!of!the!field.!HVS!as!
well!as!Jones!Lang!LaSalle!appear!as!publishers!of!countless!papers!and!studies!


















































































































P = ! !! − !!!
!
Converting!the!term!you!get:!












WACC = !!(1 − !")!! + !! !!!
As!you!can!see,!computing!the!discount!factor!is!prone!to!error!in!all!of!its!stagL





















sistent! approach! on! how! to! derive! those! figures.!What’s!more,! to!make! valid!
projections!about!a!planned!hotel!project,!a!screening!of!already!existing!comL







































their! investments! and!what! returns! they!might! expect.!We! also! talked! about!
the!evaluation!tools!necessary!for!assessing!the!viability!of!such!an!investment.!













will! focus!on! the!decisionLmaking!process!and! its!discussion!within! literature.!
To!find!out,!if!there!are!any!widely!used!heuristics!or!shortcuts!amongst!invesL
tors,!a!brief!introduction!into!decisionLmaking!theory!should!be!provided.!SubL




























banker,! a!manager! of! a!VC! company! and! a! business! angel.!While! the! particiL





















‘bankers’ funding decisions will be dominated by financial considerations and
they will give little consideration to entrepreneurial capabilities or the charac-
teristics of the opportunity’ is supported.
VCFMs have a very different approach to investment appraisal. They give
greatest emphasis to market issues (22%) and financial issues (21%), which
receive approximately equal weighting in terms of thought units. Two further
criteria – the entrepreneur (12%) and strategy (11%) – are of secondary import-
ance. This conflicts with the conclusions of post hoc studies which typically find
that the entrepreneur is the most important factor, but confirms the findings of
other verbal protocol studies by Hall and Hofer (1993) and Zacharakis and
Meyer (1995) that the entrepreneur is not the primary determinant at the initial
screening stage. Hypothesis 2, which states that ‘VCFMs will also be concerned
with financial issues but in addition will give considerable emphasis to the entre-
preneurial team and market characteristics’ is therefore also supported.
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Table 2. Overall Assessment of the Funding Proposals: By Type of Funder and Proposal
Bank 1 Bank 2 Bank 3 VC 1 VC 2 VC 3 BA 1 BA 2 BA 3 BA 4
Internet ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 3 ! !
Training
Company
Restaurant ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 3
Chain
Lab Testing 3 3 3 3 3 ! 3 ! ! 3
Company
Key: ! = reject; 3 = consider in more detail
Table 3. Verbal Protocol Frequency Counts
Funding Criterion % of Thought Units (averaged by type of funder)
Banker (n = 3) Venture Capital Fund Business Angel 
Manager (n = 3) (n = 4)
Entrepreneur 9.0 12.0 16.8
Strategy 5.7 11.0 2.0
Operations 4.3 4.7 3.8
Product 2.7 6.7 5.5
Market 12.3 22.0 19.8
Finance 55.3 21.3 22.5
Investor Fit 0 1.0 13.5
Business Plan 2.7 6.7 4.8
Other 8.0 14.7 11.8
Total 100 100 100
Notes: Each respondent reviewed three funding opportunities. Percentages do not add up to
100 because of rounding.
ISB 042377 (bc/t)  26/4/04  2:30 pm  Page 239


















group’s factor weights were highly correlated (rank correlation ¼ 0.90), there were
significant differences in their factor priorities. In particular, hotel owners/operators
placed a higher weight on location factors (37.1 per cent) than did hotel investors (21.7
per cent), while hotel investors placed the highest weight on financial factors (40.2 per
cent). This reflects hotel owners/operators being more familiar with the key drivers of
operational performance when evaluating hotel investments, as well as being more
cognisant of the business aspects of hotel investment compared to hotel investors.
Hotel investors prioritised financial factors (40.2 per cent), reflecting their focus on
investment performance analysis characteristics; particularly forecast ROI, historic
returns and gross operating profit. As such, hotel investors prioritised financial
performance outcomes, while hotel owners/operators placed greater emphasis on the
process or factors influencing the outcome.
Table V presents the respective factor weights for assessing differences between
private investors and public investors in hotels. The rank correlation for the
weightings for private and public hotel investors was 0.806. The major differences
between these two groups was public investors giving a higher priority to location








Financial 37.0 Forecast ROI (five years) 12.5 1
Gross operating profit 6.4 3
Historical rates of return 6.2 6
RevPAR as a return measure 5.1 7
Unsystematic risk 3.5 11
Economies of scale advantages 3.2 13
Location 29.9 Site attributes 7.4 2
Current hotel supply 6.4 4
Volatility of demand 6.3 5
Number of domestic visitors 4.5 9
Number of international visitors 2.8 15
Age of target hotel 2.6 17
Economic 14.5 Business spending patterns 3.5 12
Interest rates 2.7 16
Extent market is emerging 2.3 18
Tourist spending patterns 2.2 19
Extent market is mature 2.1 21
Employment growth (office) 1.8 24
Diversification 12.0 Segment diversification 4.8 8
Geographic diversification 3.0 14
Link to target property 2.2 20
Brand diversification 2.0 23
Relationships 6.6 Alignment with stakeholders 3.5 10
Independent asset management 2.1 22
Regulatory influence 0.9 25
Total 100 100
Table III.




















hypotheses! that! were! derived! from! the! theoretical! part! of! this! thesis! will! be!
tested!now.!
First! and! foremost,! the! importance! of! feasibility! studies! within! the! decisionL



































To!present!the!problem!in! its!entirety,! three!types!of! investors!that,! following!

















Interview.2. Date:!05/18/2012! Duration:!13:43! Private!Investor!
!
The!second!interviewee!was!also!a!private!investor!that!consults!other! investors!
on! the! side.! Furthermore,! he! owns! a! hotel!management! company! and! has! nuL
merous!investments!in!the!Austrian!agribusiness.!
Interview.3. Date:!05/22/2012! Duration:!32:20! Banker!
!
! 82!


























an! open! dialogue! was! held! that! broadly! revolved! around! the! following! quesL

















The! transcripts! of! the! interviews! were! analysed,! using! basic! content! analysis!
techniques43.!The!aim!was!to! identify!similar!patterns!within!the!answers!and!
thereby!derive!general!categories! that!may!help! to!answer! the! initial! research!
question.!(see!chapter!5.6!Content!Analysis)!
The! second! part! of! the! study! was! of! a! more! quantitative! matter.! To! answer!
question!2,!
“What, type, of, information, delivering,which, kind, of,message, is, crucial, for,what,
type,of,decision,maker?”,!
the!respondents!were!asked!to!rank!seven!factors!and!within!each!factor,!three!







from! the! theoretical! part! of! the! thesis.! (see! chapter! 5.7! Results! of! the! factor!
ranking)!
!!
Factors. Rank. . Sub!factors! Rank.
! ! ! ! !
LocationL!&!MarketLAnalysis! ! ! Region,,Town,,Location, !
! ! ! Supply,and,Demand, !
! ! ! Competitive,Situation, !
! ! ! , !
Corporate!Concept! ! ! Product,Concept, !
! ! ! Sales%,&,Marketing%Concept, !
! ! ! Organisational,Concept, !
! ! ! , !
Investment!Concept! ! ! , !
! ! ! , !
Efficiency!Analysis! ! ! Sales%,&,Expense,Estimates, !
! ! ! GOP, !
☐!Management!Contract! ! ! Adjusted,NOI, !
☐!Lease!Contract! ! ! Rent,Income, !
! ! ! , !
Predicted!Income!Statement! ! ! RevPar, !
! ! ! ADR, !
! ! ! Occupancy, !
! ! ! , !
Funding! ! ! , !
! ! ! , !
Performance!Indicators! ! ! Cash%Flow, !
! ! ! ROI, !



















Most! interviewees! claimed! that! they!use! the! feasibility! study! as! a! support!
within!their!decisionLmaking!but!not!as!their!single!source!of!information.!
Private,Investor,1,complained!about!needing!a!feasibility!study!to!get!a!loan.!











vest! in! hotels.! Especially! anything! differing! from! large! urban! hotels!manL
aged!by!professional!operators!can!be!hardly!assessed!in!terms!of!risk!they!
said., Private, Investor, 1, said! that! also! a! strong!affection! to! tourism! itself! is!
necessary! to! successfully! invest! in! hotels.! People,! who! lack! that! interest,!
would!be!much!better!off!with!other!real!estate!types.!According!to!Banker,1,!
there!is!no!reason!at!all!to!invest!in!hotels!in!terms!of!accretion!of!wealth.!
Institutional, Investor, 1! noted! that! the!only!party! that!would! really!benefit!




Within! this! topic,! there!was! a!general!understanding! that!urban! locations!
should!be!managed!by!professional!operators! (not!necessarily! chains)! and!
holiday!hotels!would!be!better!off!with!the!owner!(in!the!best!case!a!family)!
also! managing! the! enterprise.! Holiday! hotels,! however,! were! not! recomL
mended! for!outside! investors!at!all,!because! they!solely!operate!with! lease!








but!would! in! fact! require!a! lot!of!explanation! for!small! investors.!Banker, 1!
! 87!
and! Institutional, Investor, 1! said! that!with!a! strong!diversification!amongst!
locations!and!categories,!one!could!achieve!a!certain!kind!of!yield!security,!







models.! First! of! all,! they! detected! a! potential! for! new! outside! financing!
models! for! ownerLmanaged! hotels.!Banker, 1,! for! example,! said,! that!more!
and!more!participations! in!a! limited!partnership!were!undergone.!The!key!
to! this,!he!believes,! is!a!combination!of!a!decent! return!and!special! fringe!
benefits!for!the!investor,!such!as!“life!estate”!or!a!“right!of!residence”.!





As! a! feature! of! the! Austrian!market,! there! was! a! common! understanding!
amongst! the! respondents! that! because! of! its! saturation,! it! became! a! disL
placement!market!in!every!respect.!There!are!no!unknown!regions!or!towns!

























Banker!1! 7! 6! 5! 2! 4! 1! 3!
Banker!2! 4! 1! 6! 3! 5! 2! 7!
Inst.!Investor!1! 1! 2! 7! 6! 4! 5! 3!
Inst.!Investor!2! 1! 2! 4! 3! 5! 6! 7!
HNWI!1! 3! 2! 1! 6! 7! 5! 4!
HNWI!2! 2! 1! 7! 3! 6! 4! 5!




dealt! with! later),! a! clear! pattern! becomes! apparent.! Apart! from! the! two!
bankers,! all! of! the! candidates! ranked! “LocationL! &! MarketLAnalysis”! and!
“Corporate!Concept”!either!first!or!second.!However,!the!forecasts,!including!


















Banker!2! 1! 2! 3! 1! 2! 3!
Inst.!Investor!1! 1! 2! 3! 2! 3! 1!
Inst.!Investor!2! 1! 2! 3! 2! 1! 3!
HNWI!1! 1! 3! 2! 3! 1! 2!
HNWI!2! 1! 2! 3! 1! 2! 3!


















tract! investors! etc.),! on! the! other! hand! do! not!make! their! decision! purely!
upon!the!contents!of!the!study.!
!
H2:!To!attract!outside! capital,! an! extensive! forecast!of! your! financial!
figures!is!necessary.!




























empirical! part! have! to! be!made.! The!maybe!most! important! one! concerns!
the! international! validity! of! the! study.! The! Austrian! hotel! market! is,! altL
hough! its!popularity!not! exemplary! for! a!hotel!market! in! the! international!




















of! private! equity! companies! to! the! sector.! At! the! moment,! however,! the!
probability!for!this!to!happen!seems!not!that!high.!




market! is! a! relatively! young! and,! therefore,! constantly! changing!market.! If!
one!actual!success!factor!was!identified,!it!might!be!the!necessary!affiliation!
to! tourism! in!general.!The!difficulty! to!asses! this! versatile! field!of!business!
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als! Investitionsobjekt,! den! verschiedenen! Typen! von! Akteuren,! die! in! Hotels!
investieren! und! der! generellen! Beschaffenheit! des! Marktsegments! “HotelinL
vestments”.!Im!Speziellen!wird!die!Frage!beantwortet,!wie!die!jeweiligen!AkteuL
re!zu!ihrer!Entscheidung!gelangen,!in!ein!Hotel!zu!investieren!oder!nicht.!Der!
Fokus! liegt! hier! auf! Entscheidungen,! denen! (zumindest! faktisch)! die! Lektüre!
einer!„Feasibility!Study“!(Machbarkeitsstudie)!zugrunde!liegt.!Zur!empirischen!
Untermauerung!wird!mithilfe!von!Interviews,!die!mit!sechs!verschiedenen!InL









Nach!Beschreibung!des!Marktes!wendet! sich!der! folgende!Teil! den! im!Markt!






dem! ersten! Teilaspekt! der! eigentlichen! Forschungsfrage,! der! Frage! nach! der!
ausschlaggebenden! Information! für! den! Investor.! Noch! allgemein! gehalten!
werden!die!wesentlichen!Kennzahlen,!die!zu!einer!Beurteilung!eines!Hotels!nöL
tig! sind! aufgelistet.! Zusätzlich!wird! anhand! praktischer! Beispiele! ihre!matheL
matische! Herleitung! sowie! ihre! tatsächliche! Aussagekraft! behandelt.! Da! ein!
wesentlicher!Aspekt! jedes!Unternehmens!dessen!Kapitalstruktur! ist,!wird!darL
über!hinaus!der!Frage!nachgegangen,!wie!sich!das!Verhältnis!zwischen!EigenL!




Neben! einer! allgemeinen! Beschreibung! des! Instruments! „Business! Plan“!wird!












Einschätzung! des!Marktes! und!mögliche! Erfolgsfaktoren!Gegenstand! der! GeL
spräche.!Ebendiese!Gespräche!wurden!aufgezeichnet,!transkribiert!und!mit!einL
fachen!Methoden!der!Inhaltsanalyse!zusammengefasst.!






Die! Ergebnisse! zeigen,! dass! es! aufgrund! der! Verschiedenheit! der! nationalen!
Märkte!einerseits!und!der!divergierenden!persönlichen!Interessen!der!Akteure!
andererseits!sehr!schwer!ist,!allgemeine!Entscheidungsmuster!zu!identifizieren.!
Die! Expertise! der! Befragten,! die! nebenbei! auch! als! einer! der! entscheidenden!
Erfolgsfaktoren!identifiziert!werden!konnte,!führte!jedoch!zu!aufschlussreichen!
Einblicken,!die!die!Branche!zu!einem!gewissen!Teil!verständlicher!machen!soll.!
!
!
!
!
!
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!
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!
!
! 118!
Appendix!III!5!Curriculum!Vitae!
.
Education!
.
Professional.Experience.!
Activities.
• Board.Member..
University.Management.Club.
Designed,!organized!and!hosted!a!successful!series!
of!events!called!“Executive!Lounge”!with!14!of!the!
most!influential!CEOs!in!Austria!!
! July!2010!to!March!2012!
• Fellowship.holder.
European.Forum.Alpbach.2011.&.2012.
! !
!!
• Master.of.Science.in.Business.Administration.
University.of.Vienna.
! October!2012!
Specialization:!Corporate!Finance.
Thesis:!“Aspects!of!Hotel!Investment”.
• Bachelor.of.Science.in.Management.and.Economics.
University.of.Innsbruck.
Thesis:!“Strategic!Considerations!about!Destination!
Development”!
Admission!to!the!“TopLPerformer”!pool!of!students!
! !
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
July!2009!
!
• High.School.Diploma.
BRG.Viktring,.Austria.
! July!2004!
!
! ! !
• Project.Manager.
Redmail.Logistics.
Developed!a!new!line!of!business!
! October!2010!to!March!
2012!!
!!
• Marketing.Assistant.
Bank.for.Tirol.and.Vorarlberg.
Organized!and!coordinated!cultural!activities!!
! October!2007!to!July!
2009!
!!
